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Understanding bank regulation
New approaches to improving the Bank Oversight System
by Don Allen Resnikoff
Don Allen Resnikoff is an attorney with
the United States Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division in
Washington, D.C. He was formerly in
practice with the New York firm of Turk,
Marsh, Kelly and Hoare. Mr. Resnikoff
received his J.D. from New York
University School of Law and his B.S.
from Rutgers University.
Views expressed in this article are the
responsibility of the author, and are not
necessarily the same as views of the
Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice. Thanks to
Laraine Laudati for suggesting some of
the legislative history and other
citations and for providing legal
insights important to this article.
Introduction
In 1991 and 1992 alarms sounded
about a looming bank crisis. The popu-
lar press raised the specter of commer-
cial bank failures matching in magni-
tude the many failures of savings and
loan institutions.I The 1992 book Bank-
ing on the Brink, by Roger Vaughn and
Edward Hill, explained that "perhaps
1,200 banks are functionally insolvent."12
The hundreds of banks that in 1991
and 1992 were feared to be on the brink
of failure have not failed.3 The popular
press no longer focuses on reports of an
impending crisis for commercial banks.
The debate about bank solvency has
continued, but it has moved off the front
pages of general circulation newspa-
pers and into the world of bankers, in-
terest groups, and political policy insid-
ers.
Bankers and many policy insiders
continue to argue that United States
banking is in financial trouble in the
sense that many banks are functionally
insolvent or at risk of becoming func-
tionally insolvent. Some also argue that
Congress should address the problem of
weak banks by reforming bank regula-
tion and making it more permissive.
Both arguments are summarized in a
recent article stating that "the [banking]
industry is within reach of real reform
as leaders in Washington and the states
begin to sound warnings that banks need
help." The article quotes Comptroller
of the Currency Eugene Ludwig as say-
ing that the bank industry's recent profit-
ability "lulls us into a false sense of
security" that obscures "the important
fact that the banking industry has been
in a secular decline.... Derrick Cephas,
New York's Superintendent of Bank-
ing, agrees, saying that banking is "vul-
nerable to periodic crisis unless certain
structural issues are addressed." Mr.
Cephas advocates legislation permit-
ting banks to branch anywhere in the
country, and permitting banks to sell
securities and insurance. He also advo-
cates that other regulatory burdens on
banks be reduced.4
Alan Greenspan, chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, expressed simi-
lar views on legislative reform.
Greenspan chided Congress for keep-
ing banks "in a competitive straightjac-
ket," and said that outdated laws, not a
growing array of competitors, could be
the cause of banking industry decline.
The Chairman advocated legislation
permitting banks to branch with fewer
restrictions, and expressed the view that
congressional passage of permissive
branching legislation is imminent. He
also advocated legislation permitting
banks to deal in securities and insur-
ance, and complained of lack of con-
gressional action. "I am struck by the
continued unwillingness of Congress to
authorize banks to compete more
broadly in securities underwriting and
insurance sales."5
Whether many banks are in financial
trouble, whether help is needed from
Congress, and how best to structure the
help, are questions of importance not
only to bankers and policy insiders. The
questions are important to a wide vari-
ety of people in their roles as taxpayers
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and consumers of bank services, as well
as interested citizens. Taxpayers in par-
ticular have reason to be interested in
the prospects for further taxpayer
financed "bailouts" of troubled banks,
which involve paying for the losses that
occur when a troubled bank is either
liquidated or merged into a healthier
institution.
The books analyzed in this article
can help the person without experience
in bank regulation to understand some
current issues of bank regulation policy.
The books discuss the question of
whether there really is a continuing prob-
lem with the financial condition of a
substantial number of United States
banks, and whether as a result there is
potential for bank failures that can cause
problems for bank consumers and tax-
payers. The books also discuss whether
changes in bank regulation policy would
help solve the problem. The books ana-
lyze the banking industry's principal
proposed solution. This solution is re-
duced government regulation, includ-
ing relaxed restrictions on bank partici-
pation in securities and insurance sales.
The rationale for the bankers' solution
is that reduced regulation will permit
banks additional opportunities to make
profit. The thought is that the more
profitable banks are, the less likely they
are to fail and put a burden on taxpayers.
The bankers' recommendation of
reduced regulation is rejected in the
Vaughn and Hill book. Vaughn and Hill
express skepticism that reduced regula-
tion is the right way to avoid bank
failures. As discussed later in this ar-
ticle, Vaughn and Hill recommend regu-
lating banks more strictly to require
high levels of solvency, so that banks
will not fail. To some extent Congress
accepted the strict approach to regula-
tion when it increased regulatory stric-
tures on banks.
Other approaches to regulation, rep-
resented by the Litan and Pierce books,
attempt to fine tune regulation and fo-
cus it narrowly on well defined public
interests. As discussed subsequently,
the Litan and Pierce books define pro-
tection of government insured bank de-
posits and avoidance of taxpayer bail-
out of banks as important public inter-
ests, and suggest regulation narrowly
focused on the goal of preventing bank-
ers from engaging in activity that puts
insured deposits at risk. These carefully
tailored solutions intend to protect gov-
ernment insured deposits from possible
risky activity by bankers while avoid-
ing unnecessary constraint on pursuit of
profit.
To put the various regulatory ap-
proaches in perspective, subsequent sec-
tions of this article provide: (1) a brief
overview of the existing United States
bank regulatory scheme; (2) a descrip-
tion of changes in the market-
place that have damaged the
profitability of banks and ar-
guably put the current regula-
tory scheme in jeopardy; (3)
further discussion of bankers'
proposals for regulatory re- b
forms that would permit a
broader business activity for
banks; (4) a detailed exposi-
tion of the views of authors
Vaughn and Hill favoring strict regula-
tion; (5) a detailed exposition of Litan' s
and Pierce's tailored approach to regu-
lation; (6) a detailed discussion of re-
cent Congressional response to regula-
tion issues, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation Improvements Act of
1991 (FDICIA); (7) a report of some
comments of participants in a confer-
ence on the FDICIA; and (8) a conclud-
ing comment.
1. A Brief Overview of United
States Bank Regulation
A key feature of the United States
bank regulatory scheme is government-
backed deposit insurance, which is per-
ceived by many as having great public
benefits, including increased stability
of banks and reduction of risk for small
bank depositors.6 Because of deposit
insurance, depositors have no need to
withdraw deposits from troubled banks.
Deposit insurance helps depositors, but
it also helps banks by making the bank-
ing business less susceptible to failure.
The very existence of government de-
posit insurance creates what is some-
times referred to as a "moral hazard,"
meaning that bankers will put bank as-
sets at risk with less care than if there
were no insurance. The "moral hazard"
concern is essentially the same as for
insurance generally, and involves the
tendency of those who have the benefit
of insurance to take risks that would be
considered imprudent by uninsured per-
sons.7 The tendency of insurance to en-
courage risky behavior leads to a per-
ceived need for the government to regu-
late the risks that banks are allowed to
Litan and Pierce suggest
regulations narrowly
focused on preventing
ankers from engaging in
ctivity that puts insured
deposits at risk.
take. Indeed, the United States regula-
tory scheme may be seen as involving a
balancing of, on one hand, deposit in-
surance and other government "safety
net" protection intended to make bank-
ing stable and profitable, and, on the
other hand, government imposed limits
on bank activity intended to avoid the
moral hazard of undue risk taking by
bankers in reliance on the safety net.8
The government safety net includes,
in addition to deposit insurance, bank
access to funding from the Federal Re-
serve "discount window."9 This name
derives from the Fed practice of provid-
ing funding to banks by buying com-
mercial paper at a varying discount rate.
At one time the Federal Reserve did so
through an actual teller's window. There
has also been some legal protection
against unbridled competition: entry of
new competition has been controlled by
statute."° Until the 1970s banks had a
Volume 6 Number 4 / Summer 1994 109
I Lea Arice
cheap source of funds in the form of
legally assured low interest rate depos-
its." Another part of the safety net has
been the "too big to fail" policy of
regulators which has protected large
banks, but not smaller banks, from fail-
ure.
12
The success of the United States bank
regulatory scheme depends on banks
having the ability to be profitable. If
banks cannot be profitable, the conse-
quence is bank failures that put stress on
the government's arrangement for in-
suring deposits. This leads to taxpayer
bailouts of insolvent banks and a series
of other possible dire consequences. In
addition, distressed banks cannot do
well at a variety of things banks are
expected to do, including facilitating
the Federal Reserve Board's various
policies affecting money supply and
interest rates, and making loans to small
businesses.
2. The Recent Deterioration of
Bank Profitability
There is little doubt that the banking
business and the functioning of the gov-
ernment safety net has changed over the
years. This change has damaged the
profit-making ability of United States
banks, and increased the likelihood of
bank failures. The significant disagree-
ment is about how serious the damage
is, and what regulatory policy approach
is appropriate to repair the damage.
A core activity of banks that has
suffered recently is "intermediation,"
where banks serve as financial interme-
diaries in business transactions by mak-
ing loans and financing those loans by
use of customer deposits or other assets.
Banks hold assets representing a frac-
tion of the value of loans outstanding as
a reserve. In the past, banks were pro-
tected in the intermediation function
not only by access to low interest cus-
tomer deposits and the other "safety
net" legal protection discussed above,
but also by favorable market condi-
tions. Only banks had access to knowl-
edge of the customer's financial viabil-
ity, the risks of the particular transac-
tion to be financed, and the types of
loans suitable to the situation.
At present, banks' unique access to
credit information has been eroded by
technological advances in communica-
tions, which facilitate easy transmittal
of information relevant to lending deci-
sions. Also, banks have lost much of
their power to command low-cost funds
provided by low interest deposits. New
competitors for deposits have arisen,
such as non-bank offerors of mutual
funds, and legal regulations assuring
low interest payments to depositors by
banks have been dropped as counter-
productive for banks. Once the banks
had non-bank competitors offering de-
positors similar but higher interest pay-
ing investment alternatives, legal re-
quirements that banks pay low interest
to depositors no longer helped banks
compete. The result is that banks must
hustle to compete for funds in financial
markets, and have no special way to get
cheap funds.
Bankers and others report that an-
other recent problem for banks is that
businesses that once would have been
borrowers from banks now often obtain
funds elsewhere. Larger businesses ob-
tain funds by issuing securities more
frequently than in the past. Other large
borrowers have moved to issuing com-
mercial paper rather than borrowing
from banks. Other new competitors to
banks are specialty lenders, such as ven-
dors that make loans for purchase of
such products as cars and industrial
equipment.'3 Consequently, banks feel
pressured to make up for the loss of
traditional lending business by taking
on more risky loans and other more
risky business.
If reports of marketplace changes
are correct, then the financial problems
of at least some banks are not likely to
go away easily. If banks can no longer
rely on low interest rate deposits for
cheap funds, and banks face serious
non-bank competition for many cat-
egories of lending, then it is not obvious
how banks can do as well financially in
the future as they have done in the past.
In Banking on the Brink, authors
Vaughn and Hill argue that while mar-
ket changes have affected banks' ability
to find inexpensive assets and good cus-
tomers for loans, bankers have greatly
exaggerated the consequences of mar-
ket changes. Vaughn and Hill believe
that many banks survive in good condi-
tion. They explain: "America now has
two banking industries. One is strong,
profitable and internationally competi-
tive. The other is dying. Of the world's
20 most profitable big banks, half are
American (none is Japanese and only
one is German). The average rate of
return on equity for the top half of the
industry is easily competitive with other
sectors of the economy."' 4
In addition, Vaughn and Hill con-
tend that many of the United States
banks that are doing badly are simply
suffering from poor management lead-
ing to bad loans to foreign governments,
imprudent real estate investors, oil in-
vestors, and others.' 5
3. The Bankers' View of
Regulatory Reform
If there have been at least some
substantial market changes adverse to
banks, and at least some banks are in
great difficulty, what regulatory changes
are likely to help avoid bank failures?
Bankers often argue that the solution to
the banking industry's problems is re-
duced regulation. Arguments for re-
duced regulation sometimes include
proposals to eliminate government pro-
vided deposit insurance, but deregula-
tion proposals recently urged on Con-
gress have generally not gone that far.
Deregulation arguments have focused
on statutes and regulations that limit the
business activities of United States
banks. A particular target is a law that
keeps banks away from commercial
activities such as sales of securities and
insurance, and which have the purpose
of avoiding risky activity by banks.
Another target is a law that limits geo-
110 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Lead* Artile
graphic expansion of banks. Possible
repeal of both kinds of limiting statutes
has been a major focus of recent Con-
gressional attention. 16
A. Separation of Commercial and
Investment Banks. The Glass-Steagall
Act limits the business activity of banks
by creating a wall of separation be-
tween commercial banking and invest-
ment banking. Securities underwriting
by banks is constrained by the Act. 7
Glass-Steagall is supplemented by the
Bank Holding Company Act, which
prohibits bank holding companies or
I Expansion of banking
activity into securities c
lead to an unwise expan
of the government safet!
their non-bank subsidiaries from many
non-bank activities. 8 The stated pur-
pose of the Glass-Steagall Act is to
provide for the safety and more effec-
tive use of the Federal Reserve Banks as
a source of bank funds and to prevent
the undue diversion of bank funds into
speculative business investment. In other
words, Glass-Steagall limits the scope
of bank activity in order to reduce risky
activity by bankers in reliance on de-
posit insurance and other government
safety net protection.
The Glass-Steagall "firewall" con-
cept has been weakened over the years.
Federal Reserve regulations have been
modified to permit, for example, lim-
ited stock selling by special bank sub-
sidiaries. 9 Also, the Comptroller of the
Currency has given permission for some
bank "self-underwriting" of securities.20
Federal Reserve Board Regulation K
permits United States banks to engage
in some securities transactions overseas
that are not permitted in the United
States. 2' Nevertheless, to a substantial
extent the firewall separation of bank-
ing and securities underwriting has re-
mained intact.
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Opponents of the firewall concept
argue that it needlessly damages banks'
opportunities for profit, possibly lead-
ing to financial problems for many banks
and even failure for some. These prob-
lems cause stress on deposit insurance
and other elements of the regulatory
structure. Separating banking and com-
merce decreases bank safety and sound-
ness because banks have fewer sources
of capital than if banking and commerce
were allowed to coexist. Opponents also
argue that firewalls prevent synergies
that would result from combining com-
mercial banking and invest-
ment banking within one
entity. However, other ma-
ould jor capitalist economies,
Sion such as Germany and Ja-
pan, permit greater inter-
, net. twining of commercial
banking and industrial in-
vestment than is permitted in the United
States. But for some people in this coun-
try the expansion of banks into indus-
trial business raises the specter of ex-
cessive concentrations of economic
power.
Not everyone agrees that Glass-
Steagall firewalls are bad. Some argue
that repeal of Glass-Steagall would
impair bank safety and soundness by
permitting highly risky activity. The
argument is that expansion of banking
activity to securities could lead to un-
wise expansion of the government safety
net and create a moral hazard that bank-
ers will take great risks over an ex-
panded range of financial activities. In
effect, the federal government would
guarantee not only traditional banking
activities, but also the additional types
of financial activity allowable to banks
after repeal of the Glass-Steagall re-
strictions. In the event of a severe eco-
nomic downturn, the federal guarantee
of expanded bank activities would re-
quire a bailout of tremendous propor-
tions.
B. Limits on Bank Branches. The
McFadden Act of 192722 initiated an-
other kind of limit on the business activ-
ity of banks, a restriction against free
branching. National banks may estab-
lish branches only within the home state
and only as extensively as state law
permits state-chartered banks to branch.
State banks may establish interstate
branches only if a specific interstate
agreement permits it. Bank holding com-
panies may not acquire a bank in an-
other state unless the laws of the second
state specifically authorize the acquisi-
tion.23
Some recent liberalization of geo-
graphic restrictions on banks has oc-
curred. For instance, some states have
eased restrictions on branching and in-
terstate banking. Federal regulatory au-
thorities have offered interstate branch-
ing opportunities as an incentive to banks
acquiring failing thrift institutions. To a
great extent, however, the old prohibi-
tions on branching remain in effect.
Bankers, particularly those from
large banks, argue against the geo-
graphic constraints of the McFadden
Act and Douglas Amendment. They
argue that geographic constraints cause
the American banking business to be
less efficient and more fragmented than
would otherwise be the case. Defenders
of geographic restraints, including small
regional banks, fear that repeal of the
McFadden Act would cause industry
consolidation into fewer but larger
banks, and that small businesses and
community institutions would be less
well served.
4. Vaughn and Hill: A Strict
Approach to Regulation
Vaughn and Hill find relatively little
value in the previously discussed regu-
latory reform proposals that would per-
mit an expanded scope of activity to
banks. Vaughn and Hill are cynical about
the claimed benefits of repeal of the
McFadden, Glass-Steagall, and the
Bank Holding Acts. "On balance, re-
pealing these three laws appears to offer
modest gains for both banks and con-
sumers, though such benefits would re-
main mainly a sideshow to the main
ILadArtile
issues facing American banking .... The
banking debate is not about how to save
the banking industry. American banks
are among the best in the world: well
capitalized, well run, and highly profit-
able. The banking debate is what to do
about the 1,179 dead and dying banks,
and the 1,492 crippled banks, that to-
gether manage more than a third of all
banking assets. '2 4
Vaughn and Hill focus on new regu-
latory steps to force banks to high levels
of solvency. Their attention is on the
moral hazard problem of bankers en-
gaging in risky investment behavior in
reliance on the government safety net as
a means for avoiding failure. They rec-
ommend steps that would close insol-
vent banks and limit bank access to
deposit insurance. The regulatory steps
Vaughn and Hill advocate would avoid
putting great stress on government-pro-
vided deposit insurance, and would
make the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation successful without recourse
to taxpayer bailouts. "If commercial
bank losses are to be stopped, reform of
the deposit insurance system is essen-
tial. While drastic reforms would be
best... more modest reforms-such as
adjusting premiums to reflect risk better
or boosting capital requirements-are
the only game in town. 2 5
5. Litan's and Pierce's Tailored
Approaches to Regulation
This article has discussed proposals
to eliminate Glass-Steagall firewalls and
McFadden geographic constraints, as
well as proposals for stricter regulation
to assure bank solvency. Another kind
of proposal involves tailored bank re-
form, as discussed in Litan's What
Should Banks Do?' and Pierce's The
Future of Banking." The premise of the
tailored regulatory proposals is that
government regulation should be nar-
rowly applied only where needed to
address a serious problem not solvable
by ordinary free market mechanisms.
Application of that premise depends on
one's point of view. A socialist skepti-
cal of free market solutions will be
quicker to find a need for a governmen-
tal solution than a strong free market
advocate.
Both Litan and Pierce accept gov-
ernment provided insurance as a desir-
able goal, and the idea that government
regulation is needed to deal with the
moral hazard problem of bankers taking
great risk in reliance on government-
provided safety net arrangements that
make failure unlikely. Litan and Pierce
suggest regulations narrowly drawn to
meet those goals, so that bankers' free-
dom to take business risks is not unnec-
essarily interfered with.
Litan advocates a regulatory reform
approach that would continue the con-
cept of government insured deposits,
yet permit bankers the expanded field of
activity they want "[Financial conglom-
erates that choose to offer banking ser-
vices would be required to organize.. .by
separating deposit taking from lending
activities. Specifically, this approach
would authorize the creation of new
'financial holding companies' (FHCs),
which would be free to engage through
separate subsidiaries in any activity,
financial or non-financial," subject to
certain restrictions.28 The restrictions
are that the "banks" in FHCs would be
required to operate as insured money
market funds, accepting deposits and
investing only in highly liquid safe se-
curities. Financial holding companies
could extend loans, but only through
separately incorporated subsidiaries
wholly funded by uninsured liabilities
and equity. Only the "narrow banks"
would have access to the Federal Re-
serve payment system as a source of
funding.29
Pierce endorses a similar narrow bank
concept. Under Pierce's plan, monetary
services such as federally insured ac-
counts payable on demand, checking
accounts, electronic fund transfer, pay-
ment, and similar services, are provided
by separately capitalized monetary ser-
vice companies within the bank struc-
ture. Monetary companies are limited
to holding only safe assets. These spe-
cialized companies cannot make loans.
Thus, monetary activities are isolated
from all others within banks. All activi-
ties other than those of monetary ser-
vice companies would be placed in
financial service companies, which
would be separate entities that could
exist within a bank's conglomerate cor-
porate structure. The financial service
companies would operate essentially
without federal firewall, geographic
limit, or any other regulation of the
nature and scope of business.30
6. Congress' Solution: The
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvements
Act of 1991
By the time the Vaughn and Hill
book was published, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ments Act of 1991 (FDICIA)31 went
into effect. The FDICIA to some extent
matches the strict regulation approach
suggested by Vaughn and Hill. As ex-
plained by Kaufman and Litan in the
introduction to their 1993 work Assess-
ing Bank Reform,32 with the FDICIA
Congress enacted a "new capital-based
system of early regulatory intervention
to reduce the cost of failures to the
FDIC, together with $30 billion in bor-
rowing authority for the FDIC, while
adding a variety of additional regula-
tory provisions [intended] to protect
consumers and to better ensure the safety
and soundness of banks."3 3 However, it
seems unlikely that the high degree of
regulatory action advocated by Vaughn
and Hill is met by the level of current
enforcement of the FDICIA.
7. Comments of Participants in
the Conference on the FDICIA
Assessing Bank Reform reports on a
conference of scholars, policymakers,
and private sector people who discussed
the 1991 FDICIA and the future of the
United States banking industry.
With regard to financial soundness
of banks, a number of participants in the
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FDICIA conference reinforce the no-
tion that not too much comfort should
be taken from the small number of re-
cent bank failures. William Haraf of
Citicorp argues that recent strong bank
industry profits are largely the result of
a favorable interest rate and improve-
ment in the economy. Haraf believes
that the continuing decline in bank in-
termediation functions and the regula-
tory burdens of FDICIA and other stat-
utes will further shrink the banking in-
dustry.34 David Mullins, of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, suggested that "all is not well when
roughly 15 percent of the [banking]
industry's assets-half a trillion dol-
lars-is in troubled institutions."35 Ed-
ward Kane, of Boston College, omi-
nously points out that many banks are
"deeply economically insolvent, even
though their accounting ratios are not
yet desperate enough to force federal
regulators to demand recapitalization
or to impose other mandatory disci-
plines." Kane explains: "The electorate
must understand that there could only
have been a surprise [involving many
bank failures] this December [1992] if
it came from the policies of the new
President and the new Congress. It could
not come from the tangible capital trig-
ger set by the FDICIA. Scheduling a
life-and-death exam one year ahead
and making the right answer to the test
question known in advance gave zom-
bie [banking] firms ample opportunity
to cram effectively for the test."36
The 1993 Litan-Kaufman book con-
tains many references to the real poli-
tics of bank reform. Robert Glauber,
former undersecretary of the treasury,
explains that "powerful forces" were
arrayed when Congress considered
broad bank reform legislation supported
by the Bush administration. That legis-
lation would have permitted expanded
bank powers and branching. "First and
foremost, the [proposed] structural
changes were viewed as deregulation,
which many saw as having caused the
S&L debacle.... Second, the chairmen
of both Senate and House banking com-
mittees wanted a 'narrow' bill.... And
finally there were the industry lobbies:
the powerful securities and insurance
lobbies opposed to reform.... [T]he
strongest industry group supporting the
administration [reform] legislation was
the Financial Services Council..., (Ford,
Citicorp, American Express, Sears,
Bankers Trust, John Hancock, among
others)."37
Conclusion
Consumers of bank services, tax-
payers, and citizens are capable of intel-
ligently considering regulation issues
raised by the reported financial difficul-
ties of banks, even without prior back-
ground in bank regulation. A goal of
this article has been to demonstrate that
the issues are comprehensible. The
books discussed provide accessible dis-
cussions of the issues. They teach that it
is quite plausible that many banks are
having financial difficulties, and that
the range of possible responsive regula-
tory reforms runs from broad deregula-
tion to rigorous new regulation of banks.
In evaluating which regulatory solu-
tions are best, it is important to keep in
mind that the current United States regu-
latory scheme involves government
deposit insurance and other "safety net"
protections of bank stability. They are
balanced by government restrictions that
limit risky activity by bankers in reli-
ance on the government safety net. Each
of the regulatory proposals advocated
in the books respect that regulatory bal-
ance.
The Litan-Pierce proposals are not
panaceas. The proposals do not purport
to address all the regulatory issues of
banking, including such issues as how
the Federal Reserve Board should deal
with its monetary duties in a period of
banking decline, and how the govern-
ment should deal with possible credit
problems of small and medium sized
businesses. In addition, it is likely that
the need for regulation cannot be en-
tirely contained within the "narrow"
banks Litan and Pierce propose: the less
regulated "broad" banks will remain
capable of mischief requiring govern-
ment intervention to protect the con-
suming public. Nevertheless, the pro-
posals are instructive in suggesting how
to focus bank regulation so that it is
efficient and addresses well defined
problems.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that
the regulatory solutions that are best are
those most likely to achieve well-de-
fined and important public policy goals
with minimum burden on bank con-.
sumers, taxpayers, and the banks. Ap-
plying this standard, the tailored ap-
proaches of Litan and Pierce have much
to recommend them. They provide
strong protection of the security of the
deposits of bank customers, but put little
burden on government deposit insur-
ance and few constraints on banks. Both
government support of important bank-
ing functions and government limita-
tion of banking endeavors is achieved at
relatively low cost.
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